The influence of historiography on aspects of political thought in France, Italy and Germany. In recent years the overlap between political thought and historiography has changed the boundaries of intellectual history. Donald Kelley, the longtime editor of The Journal of the History of Ideas has played a leading part in this process. These essays by his friends and former students follow in his footsteps. The collection is divided into three parts: France, England [six essays], and Italy and Germany [four essays]. (...) Anthony Grafton and John Salmon provide an introduction, and the volume concludes with a bibliography of Donald Kelley's many works. Historians and Ideologues is designed for those with an interest in the contribution of historiography to political thought, and will be a timely addition to the growing reaction against the postmodern scepticism in historiographical research in this field. Contributors include Ann Blair, Julian Franklin, Kathleen Parrow, David Harris Sacks, Sarah Hanley, Daniel Woolf, Gordon Schochet, Joseph Levine, John Pocock, Perez Zagorin, William Connell, Donald Phillip Verene, and Michael Carhart. Anthony Grafton is a Professor in the Department of History at Princeton University. John Salmon is the Marjorie Walter Goodheart Emeritus Professor of History at Bryn Mawr College. (shrink)

Many countries are looking back at the pandemic and reflecting on what could have been done better. The UK COVID-19 Inquiry rumbles on 1 and other influential groups such as the British Medical Association have already reviewed the British response to the pandemic and made recommendations about what should happen in the future. 2 The UK is not alone in looking for lessons from the pandemic with a view to preparing for the next one. Countries with a very different COVID-19 (...) experience, such as Australia and New Zealand, have also commenced national inquiries with a view to becoming better prepared for the next pandemic. 3 4 While many of the issues revolve around public health and government responses, there are also profound ethical issues that demand reflection on the conceptual resources we use when responding to new ethical challenges. The _Journal of Medical Ethics_... (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) and its introduction into clinical pathways presents an array of ethical issues that are being discussed in the JME. 1–7 The development of AI technologies that can produce text that will pass plagiarism detectors 8 and are capable of appearing to be written by a human author 9 present new issues for medical ethics. One set of worries concerns authorship and whether it will now be possible to know that an author or student in fact produced submitted (...) work. That seems likely to be a general worry for secondary and higher education, as well as for all academic journals. Thus far generative AI chatbots do not seem to be able to produce a fully referenced and well-argued ethics article, but they probably could generate a blog or student essay that would... (shrink)

Socially responsible publishers, such as the BMJ Publishing Group, have demonstrated a commitment to health equity and working towards rectifying the structural racism that exists both in healthcare and in medical publishing.1 The commitment of academic publishers to collecting information relevant to promoting equity and diversity is important and commendable where it leads to that result.2 However, collecting sensitive demographic data is not a morally neutral activity. Rather, it carries with it both known and potential risks. Among these are issues (...) around privacy or data misuse, as well as more basic concerns about how, when or why people should be categorised in certain ways and/or prompted to conceive of themselves or their identities in certain terms.3 If such data are to be collected, therefore, their effectiveness in achieving the stated ends must have a sufficiently compelling evidence base so as to justify the various risks involved. And where possible, these risks must also be identified and minimised. As Varcoe et al 4 argue, > While most leaders and healthcare workers and some patients [in their study] envisioned potential benefits associated with having ethnicity data, these benefits were seen as largely contingent upon action being taken to [actually] ameliorate inequities. Overwhelmingly, however, leaders from ethno-cultural communities and patients of diverse identities anticipated potential harm arising both from having ethnicity data and the process of collection. The analysis illustrates that in today’s sociopolitical context, collecting ethnicity data in clinical contexts may engender considerable harm, particularly for racialized, vulnerable patients. (p1569) Varcoe et al refer to ‘ethnicity’ data, which as they note is an ambiguous concept, potentially encompassing such diverse notions as ancestry, language, religion or culture. It is also a term that is in some contexts—for example, the USA—often used interchangeably with a different, more highly charged term: ‘race’. Data …. (shrink)

The non-identity problem arises when an intervention or behavior changes the identity of those affected. Delaying pregnancy is an example of such a behavior. The problem is whether and in what ways such changes in identity affect moral considerations. While a great deal has been written about the non-identity problem, relatively little has been written about the implications for physicians and how they should understand their duties. We argue that the non-identity problem can make a crucial moral difference in some (...) circumstances, and that it has some interesting implications for when it is or is not right for a physician to refuse to accede to a patient's request. If a physician is asked to provide an intervention (identity preserving) that makes a person worse off, then such harm provides a good reason for the physician to refuse to provide the intervention. However, in cases where different (identity-altering) interventions result in different people having a better or worse life, physicians should normally respect patient choice. (shrink)

This is the first book that explains how you actually go about doing good bioethics. John McMillan develops an account of the nature of bioethics; he reveals how a number of methodological spectres have obstructed bioethics; and then he shows how moral reason can be brought to bear upon practical issues via an 'empirical, Socratic' approach.

Eugenicists in the 1930s and 1940s emphasised our moral responsibilities to future generations and the importance of positively selecting traits that would benefit humanity. In 1935 Herbert Brewer recommended ‘Eutelegenesis’ so that that future generations are not only protected from hereditary disease but also become more intelligent and fraternal than us. The development of these techniques for human use and animal husbandry was the catalyst for the cross fertilization of moral ideas and the development of a critical procreative morality. While (...) eugenicists argued for a new critical morality, religious critics argued against artificial insemination because of its potential to damage important moral institutions. The tension between critical and conservative procreative morality is a feature of the contemporary debates about reproductive technologies. This and some of the other aspects of the early and contemporary debates about artificial insemination and reproductive technologies are discussed in this article. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 9.1 (2002) 91-92 [Access article in PDF] Jaspers and Defining Phenomenology John McMillan IT IS POSSIBLE TO DISTINGUISH a number of positions that you might take on the importance of phenomenology for the study of the mind. The strongest position is to think that phenomenology is sufficient for understanding the mind. This is a position that would be very hard to defend and (...) it is unlikely that Gupta and Kay want to endorse such a view. It is clear that Jaspers did not believe this; although he thought that first-person experience was undervalued, his project was an attempt to make sense of different kinds of explanation, all of which contribute to our understanding of the mind.A second position is to deny that phenomenology gives us anything that is of use in understanding the mind and psychopathology. Philosophers have developed a number of such positions, from the eliminativism of Churchland (1981) to the heterophenomenology of Daniel Dennett (1989, 1991).A third position is to hold that phenomenology is one of the methods that are useful for understanding the mind and psychopathology. Along with neuroscience and other more behavioral approaches to behavior, phenomenology is an important component of an adequate understanding of the mind. This position appears to be that endorsed by Jaspers, Gupta, Kay, and the authors they discuss. It is also the position that Grant Gillett and I defend in Consciousness and Intentionality (2001). Gupta and Kay's paper presents an argument about where the boundaries between phenomenology and other approaches to the mind and psychopathology ought to be drawn. Gupta and Kay, following Jaspers, think that the boundaries of the phenomenological ought to be drawn around those approaches that employ empathy and the presuppositionless stance and do not include objective phenomena.Given that the paper is primarily about what phenomenology means and that it endorses the way that Jaspers used the term, it is fairly important that we have a definition from Jaspers. Gupta and Kay give a description of some of Jaspers's methods for getting at subjective phenomena, but do not give an account of what Jaspers thinks the aim of phenomenology is. In other words, one way to classify something as phenomenological is its methods and another is by what the point of the exercise is. In General Psychopathology, Jaspers (1997) says that phenomenology is an empirical method for investigating "individual psychic experience" (p. 55). We can think of this as a claim about the objective of phenomenology and then consider the merits of different phenomenological methodologies in terms of their success in achieving this objective. This opens up the possibility that a theory may be genuinely phenomenological because it has a plausible method for getting at psychic lived experience but does not use all of the methods advocated by Jaspers.Gupta and Kay are correct that Jaspers does stress the importance of the presuppositionless [End Page 91] stance, the importance of empathy and the importance of not simply relying on objective phenomena. However, it is not obvious why an approach to understanding the mind or psycho- pathology must satisfy these conditions to be phenomenological. Imagine the following kind of situation: when I am observed to hit my big toe against a brick and give a yelp, it is possible to infer something about my psychic lived experience. There is not much is room for doubt about my first-person experience and, although you might ask me questions about my pain, they are unlikely to add much to what you can simply read from my behavior. This example may appear a little crude because the first-person experience in this case is not especially complex and is not that interesting as a entrance to the inner workings of an individual's mental life. It is not hard to come up with other examples where we can read the first-person experience from behavior in a fairly accurate and informative way. A father gazing at his young child while she is sleeping in his arms may be having a number of thoughts that we would not know about... (shrink)

The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment have conducted visits and written reports criticising the surgical castration of sex offenders in the Czech Republic and Germany. They claim that surgical castration is degrading treatment and have called for an immediate end to this practice. The Czech and German governments have published rebuttals of these criticisms. The rebuttals cite evidence about clinical effectiveness and point out this is an intervention that must be requested (...) by the sex offender and cannot occur without informed consent. This article considers a number of relevant arguments that are not discussed in these reports but which are central to how we might assess this practice. First, the article discusses the possible ways in which sex offenders could be coerced into castration and whether this is a decisive moral problem. Then, it considers a number of issues relevant to determining whether sex offenders are harmed by physical castration. The article concludes by arguing that sex offenders should not be coerced into castration, be that via threats or offers, but that there is no reason to think that this is occurring in the Czech Republic or Germany. In some cases, castration might be useful for reconfiguring a life that has gone badly awry and where there is no coercion, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment are mistaken about this being degrading treatment. (shrink)

Some bioethicists are concerned about other bioethicists being paid by corporations. These concerns make sense if you have a particular view about what the most important role of a bioethicist should be. If you believe that a bioethicist should be a moral critic, attempting to expose wrongdoing, then being paid by corporations might compromise this role. It’s plausible to suppose that this can be a role for bioethicists but it’s unreasonable to insist that all bioethicists should be moral critics.

Cohen (2023), Rahimzadeh and colleagues (2023), and Porsdam Mann and colleagues (2023) have written thorough and well-canvassed pieces about the ethical and conceptual challenges of large language...

John Rawls begins a Theory of Justice with the observation that 'Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought… Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override'1. The COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in lock-downs, the restriction of liberties, debate about the right to refuse medical treatment and many other changes to the everyday behaviour of persons. The justice issues it raises are (...) diverse, profound and will demand our attention for some time. How we can respect the Rawlsian commitment to the inviolability of each person, when the welfare of societies as a whole is under threat goes to the heart of some of the difficult ethical issues we face and are discussed in this issue of the Journal of Medical Ethics. The debate about ICU triage and COVID-19 is quite well developed and this journal has published several articles that explore aspects of this issue and how different places approach it.2–5 Newdick et al add to the legal analysis of triage decisions and criticise the calls for respecting a narrow conception of a legal right to treatment and more detailed national guidelines for how triage decisions should be made.6 They consider scoring systems for clinical frailty, organ failure assessment, and raise some doubts about the fairness of their application to COVID-19 triage situations. Their argument seems to highlight instances of what is called the McNamara fallacy. US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara used enemy body counts as a measure …. (shrink)

How far has the Darwinian revolution come? To what extent have evolutionary ideas penetrated into the social sciences and humanities? Are the “science wars” over? Or do whole blocs of disciplines face off over an unbridgeable epistemic gap? To answer questions like these, contributors to top journals in 22 disciplines were surveyed on their beliefs about human nature, culture, and science. More than 600 respondents completed the survey. Scoring patterns divided into two main sets of disciplines. Genetic influences were emphasized (...) in the evolutionary social sciences, evolutionary humanities, psychology, empirical study of the arts, philosophy, economics, and political science. Environmental influences were emphasized in most of the humanities disciplines and in anthropology, sociology, education, and women's or gender studies. Confidence in scientific explanation correlated positively with emphasizing genetic influences on behavior, and negatively with emphasizing environmental influences. Knowing the current actual landscape of belief should help scholars avoid sterile debates and ease the way toward fruitful collaborations with neighboring disciplines. (shrink)

The discussion of whether psychopaths are morally responsible for their behaviour has long taken place in philosophy. In recent years this has moved into scientific and psychiatric investigation. Responsibility and Psychopathy discusses this subject from both the philosophical and scientific disciplines, as well as a legal perspective.

There’s no doubt that medical ethics should be ‘grounded’, in the sense that it aims to make a practical, normative contribution to significant ethical issues in medicine. There are a number of ways in which ethics can do that, two of which feature in this issue of the Journal of Medical Ethics. One way is by responding to significant new policy or legal developments that will have an impact on clinical practice. This issue discusses two legal developments that matter to (...) patients and healthcare professionals: the sanctions applied to Dr Bawa-Garba and the Supreme Court’s ruling on the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration. A second way of grounding ethical analysis in the reality and complexity of ethical issues is by using empirical methods. There are two papers in this issue from Canada that illustrate how the subtleties of complex ethical issues can be teased out via qualitative methods. Medical tourism is an important and rapidly developing phenomenon that raises a set of interesting and tricky ethical issues.1 It has been discussed in the Journal of Medical Ethics before and its implications for end of life, dentistry and other health interventions have been explored.2 3 Reproductive tourism occurs in many countries and the complications it can create for issues such as the citizenship of resulting children have been discussed at some length in the JME.4 5 Reproductive tourism is a good example of an area where it is particularly important for ethical analysis to be grounded in the facts and reality of a situation and an empirical approach to ethics is therefore a good option for this topic. In this issue, Couture et …. (shrink)

This article considers two related and fundamental issues about morality in a virtual world. The first is whether the anonymity that is a feature of virtual worlds can shed light upon whether people are moral when they can act with impunity. The second issue is whether there are any moral obligations in a virtual world and if so what they might be. -/- Our reasons for being good are fundamental to understanding what it is that makes us moral or indeed (...) whether any of us truly are moral. Plato grapples with this problem in book two of The Republic where Socrates is challenged by his brothers Adeimantus and Glaucon. They argue that people are moral only because of the costs to them of being immoral; the external constraints of morality. -/- Glaucon asks us to imagine a magical ring that enables its wearers to become invisible and capable of acting anonymously. The ring is in some respects analogous to the possibilities created by online virtual worlds such as Second Life, so the dialogue is our entry point into considering morality within these worlds. These worlds are three dimensional user created environments where people control avatars and live virtual lives. As well as being an important social phenomenon, virtual worlds and what people chose to do in them can shed light on what people will do when they can act without fear of normal sanction. -/- This paper begins by explaining the traditional challenge to morality posed by Plato, relating this to conduct in virtual worlds. Then the paper will consider the following skeptical objection. A precondition of all moral requirements is the ability to act. There are no moral requirements in virtual worlds because they are virtual and it is impossible to act in a virtual world. Because avatars do not have real bodies and the persons controlling avatars are not truly embodied, it is impossible for people to truly act in a virtual world. We will show that it is possible to perform some actions and suggest a number of moral requirements that might plausibly be thought to result. Because avatars cannot feel physical pain or pleasure these moral requirements are interestingly different from those of real life. Hume’s arguments for why we should be moral apply to virtual worlds and we conclude by considering how this explains why morality exists in these environments. (shrink)

The first editorial in the Journal of Medical Ethics described an ambition to be a ‘forum for the reasoned discussion of moral issues arising from the provision of medical care’.1 While that statement of intent might seem broad, it is one that has been reaffirmed by successive editors of the journal.2–4 It is an aim that aligns with the mission statement of JME and The Institute of Medical Ethics, to promote ‘ethical reflection and conduct in scientific research and medical conduct.’ (...) It is an end worthy of some reflection because it illuminates how the journal has developed and implies a conception of what good medical ethics is. During his time as editor, Raanan Gillon was a champion for philosophical medical ethics and he wrote an excellent and influential book on that topic.5 In the July issue of JME, Julian Savulescu, Tom Douglas and Dominic Wilkinson affirm the importance of philosophical medical ethics and ably demonstrate why it matters in the Charlie Gard case.6 Does that mean papers published in the JME must be philosophical? In one sense, clearly no and in another yes. Good medical ethics is not philosophy. The degree of scepticism, the narrow focus on a search for truth, the technical nature of some philosophy and it not needing to deliver normative or practical ethical conclusions mean that a narrowly philosophical approach is unlikely to be good medical ethics. JME has never been a narrowly philosophical journal and the perils of this were described well by its first editor: > We therefore intend to put editorial weight behind what we consider to be carefully argued and well informed judgments and not to allow every value …. (shrink)

How psychopaths and their capacity for moral action are viewed is not only philosophically interesting but is also important and relevant for policy. The philosophical discussion of psychopathy has focussed upon the psychological faculties that are prerequisites for moral responsibility and empirical findings regarding psychopathy that are relevant to philosophical accounts of moral understanding and motivation. However, there are legitimate worries about whether psychopathy is a robust scientific construct, and there are risks attached to reifying psychopathy or other psychiatric constructs. (...) We defend the concept of psychopathy by pointing out the relevance of empirical studies about it for our ordinary practices of ascribing moral responsibility and folk psychological accounts of moral understanding and motivation. (shrink)

There will always be debates in medical ethics about whether any particular value can be considered foundational, but there are reasons for thinking that ‘trust’ is the ground upon which many other important values is built. Sisela Bok remarks: > If there is no confidence in the truthfulness of others, is there any way to assess their fairness, their intentions to help or to harm? How, then, can they be trusted? Whatever matters to human beings, trust is the atmosphere in (...) which it thrives.1 p31 The idea that trust in what others tell us is the bedrock on which human relationships and other values are built seems plausible, but how trust is created, nurtured and sustained is perhaps the challenge for medical ethics. Annette Baier noted that trust occurs within the context of a relationship of some sort, be that with another person or an institution. > “Trust me!” is for most of us an invitation which we cannot accept at will—either we do already trust the one who says …. (shrink)

This article argues that hope is of value in clinical ethics and that it can be important for clinicians to be sensitive to both the risks of false hope and the importance of retaining hope. However, this sensitivity requires an understanding of the complexity of hope and how it bears on different aspects of a well-functioning doctor-patient relationship. We discuss hopefulness and distinguish it from three different kinds of hope, or ‘hopes for’, and then relate these distinctions back to differing (...) accounts of autonomy. This analysis matters because it shows how an overly narrow view of the ethical obligations of a clinician to their patient, and autonomy, might lead to scenarios where patients regret the choices they make. (shrink)

The question of whether any of us can truly be held responsible for what we do is an issue that occupied the ancient Greeks and continues to entertain our leading thinkers. Whether we can be held responsible for our health, or lack thereof, has additional layers of complexity because of the way in which what we do over time impacts our health. Those of us who have ever self-deceptively wondered about the apparent shrinking of our belt or at the fact (...) that the stairs seem to have multiplied are familiar with the idea that our health can change gradually over time as a result of successive choices that we have made. While there are one-off behaviours that can have an impact on health, for example, a single exposure to a very high level of radiation, in general, ill health develops over time, within an environment and complex set of interactions with other people. The implications of that complexity are central to this issue’s Feature Article by Brown and Savulescu.1 They note that there is debate over whether responsibility should play a role in the allocation of healthcare, and, rather than taking a view on that issue, make a number of suggestions about how the concept of responsibility used in healthcare can be enriched by attending to the complex relationship between behaviour and health. …. (shrink)

The JME editorial team selects its feature articles from the best papers accepted for publication based on their quality, novelty and capacity to move debate forward on a specific issue. Feature articles are made freely available and are published alongside reviewed and submitted commentaries. We do this partly to promote and acknowledge excellent work in medical ethics, but also to encourage authors to submit their best papers to the JME. JME feature articles have deepened the analysis of some central issues (...) for medical ethics. ‘Common morality’ is one way of underpinning general ethical principles and it is a concept that is central to the justification that Beauchamp and Childress give in their classic articulation of the four principles. 1 Rhodes’ critical discussion of common morality in her feature article 2 has been well cited since then, which is a good thing from the perspective of the author... (shrink)

This book explains the ethical and conceptual tensions in the use of psychopathy in different countries, including America, Canada, the UK, Croatia, Australia, and New Zealand. It offers an extensive critical analysis of how psychopathy functions within institutional and social contexts. Inside, readers will find innovative interdisciplinary analysis, written by leading international experts. The chapters explore how different countries have used this diagnosis. A central concern is whether psychopathy is a mental disorder, and this has a bearing upon whether it (...) should be used. The book’s case studies will help readers understand the problems associated with psychopathy. Academics and students working in the philosophy of psychiatry, bioethics, and moral psychology will find it a valuable resource. In addition, it will also appeal to mental health professionals working in forensic settings, psychologists with an interest in the ethical implications of the use of psychopathy as a construct and particularly those with a research interest in it. (shrink)

Policy-makers have attempted to frame the ethical requirements that are relevant to the creation of human beings via reproductive technologies. Various reports and laws enacted in New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and Britain have introduced tests for how we should weigh child welfare when using these technologies. A number of bioethicists have argued that child welfare should be interpreted as a “best interests” test. Others have argued that there are ethical reasons why we should abandon this kind of test. I will (...) argue that at least some of the relevant policy can be interpreted as requiring those wishing to exercise their procreative liberty to have a reasonable plan to care and nurture any resulting child, thereby respecting the internal preconditions of that liberty. This interpretation of child welfare requirements answers some of the ethical worries about a child welfare test. (shrink)

A reprint of the Prentice-Hall edition of 1992. Prepared by nine distinguished philosophers and historians of science, this thoughtful reader represents a cooperative effort to provide an introduction to the philosophy of science focused on cultivating an understanding of both the workings of science and its historical and social context. Selections range from discussions of topics in general methodology to a sampling of foundational problems in various physical, biological, behavioral, and social sciences. Each chapter contains a list of suggested readings (...) and study questions. (shrink)

Kerstein and Bognar (2010) and Persad, Wertheimer, and Emanuel (2009) defend specific principles for the allocation of health care resources, but their choice of principles is influenced by the exa...

When Beauchamp and Childress articulated the necessary and sufficient conditions for informed consent, they might have thought that would be the final word on what informed consent is.1 It’s emphasis in the Belmont Report,2 the Nuremberg Code,3 the Helsinki Declaration4 and numerous codes of professional ethics seems more than sufficient for emphasising its importance. Nonetheless, its place as the central issue for medical ethics appears undiminished and Pubmed lists 6192 publications with ‘Informed Consent’ in the title since 1979. One view (...) of this is that medical ethics has channelled too much intellectual effort into consent, perhaps at the expense of other important ethical issues. Papers in this issue of the Journal of Medical Ethics suggest that the discussion of consent continues because of the need to consider what it means in new contexts, how it can be a challenge in some contexts, how it is related to tough theoretical issues about the value of choice and autonomy and how it can blend into other debates. The development of biobanking and the challenges it presents about which variant of consent should apply have been discussed in the JME before. One option is for consent to be ‘broad’, meaning that when consent is given for the collection of tissue the ‘type’ of future secondary uses are specified but not the specific research studies, on the basis that the potential benefits are significant, the risks low and the costs of gaining consent for every use of tissue significant. Hofmann has argued against broad consent on the basis that being ‘informed’ is a crucial aspect of …. (shrink)

(2010). Human Rights: The Normative Engine of Fairness and Research in Developing Countries. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 10, No. 6, pp. 47-49.

This book considers questions such as these and argues for a conception of consciousness, mental content and intentionality that is anti-Cartesian in its major...

The COVID-19 pandemic will generate vexing ethical issues for the foreseeable future and many journals will be open to content that is relevant to our collective effort to meet this challenge. While the pandemic is clearly the critical issue of the moment, it’s important that other issues in medical ethics continue to be addressed as well. As can be seen in this issue, the Journal of Medical Ethics will uphold its commitment to publishing high quality papers on the full array (...) of medical ethics. At the same time, JME aims to be a premiere home for ground-breaking scholarship on the ethical issues raised by COVID-19. Toward this end, we have a number of papers that are freely available online and for which production has been fast-tracked.1–5 A challenge for authors who want to write about the pandemic is the rapidly evolving nature of the situation and the time it takes for journal content to be reviewed and published, even when fast-tracked. For that reason, all authors who would like to submit a paper on the pandemic can also submit a post to the JME blog prior to submitting a full paper to the journal. Those interested in writing for the JME blog should contact one of its editors, Hazem Zohny or Mike King. Over the last 3 weeks, 30 high-quality commentaries on the pandemic have been posted to the blog. These posts are circulated widely via the JME Twitter and Facebook feeds and have stimulated significant …. (shrink)

Some bioethicists are concerned about other bioethicists being paid by corporations. These concerns make sense if you have a particular view about what the most important role of a bioethicist should be. If you believe that a bioethicist should be a moral critic, attempting to expose wrongdoing, then being paid by corporations might compromise this role. It’s plausible to suppose that this can be a role for bioethicists but it’s unreasonable to insist that all bioethicists should be moral critics.

In my reply to Wertheimer and Miller's paper on coercive offers and payment for research participation1 I claim that ‘… it's not unreasonable to suppose that there is another normative aspect to these cases, over and above the voluntariness of consent. While the parents of children at Willowbrook and the millionaire's mistress might have given consent that was voluntary and informed, they are still wronged by taking up this offer…’2 Furthermore, nowhere in my paper on surgical castration do I claim (...) that coercive offers invalidate consent,3 and I suggest that Bomann-Larsen has come closest to cashing this out correctly with her idea that ‘the wrongness of these coercive offers has more to do with the wilful creation of choices that take advantage of others vulnerabilities…’.4 So, it is puzzling that they object to my analysis of coercion and castration because coercive offers are not readily unpacked as a problem with consent. …. (shrink)

The British have taken a comprehensive approach to regulating reproductive medicine. A loophole in the current law leaves some cases of sex selection uncovered; if that loophole were closed, however, the law is robust enough to address the concerns about sex selection while permitting it in many cases.